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Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates the 
criteria that should lead a society to allocate policy tasks to elected policymakers (politicians) 
or non elected bureaucrats. Politicians are preferable for tasks that do not involve too much 
specific technical ability relative to effort; there is uncertainty about ex post preferences of the 
public and flexibility is valuable; time inconsistency is not an issue; small but powerful vested 
interests do not have large stakes in the policy outcome; effective decisions over policies 
require taking into account policy complementarities and compensating the losers. We then 
compare this normative benchmark with the case in which politicians choose when to 
delegate and we show that the two generally differ. 
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support. 1 Introduction
Policies are chosen and implemented by both elected representatives
(politicians) and non elected bureaucrats. The idea that politicians
choose policies and bureaucrats simply implement them is simplistic;
in fact the boundaries between decision and execution are a grey area
and in many cases bureaucrats do much more than executing either de
jure or de facto. In most countries non elected central bankers conduct
monetary policy, with much independence. Regulatory policies are nor-
mally the result of both political and bureaucratic intervention. Fiscal
policy is, instead, by and large chosenby electedrepresentatives (govern-
ments and legislatures); bureaucrats are involved in important aspects
of auditing and implementation, but they do not choose tax rates or
the amount of spending for their department. Foreign policy decisions
are made by politicians, sometimes after consultation with diplomatic
or military personnel.
What criteria are used to allocate decision power amongst politicians
and bureaucrats? We explore this question both in a normative and a
positive way. First we ask what is the socially optimal allocation of
tasks, that is the allocation that would be chosen by every member
of this society behind a veil of ignorance at a constitutional table, or,
equivalently, by a social planner. Then we discuss the positive question
of whether and how politicians interested in reelection would ¯nd it in
their interests to delegate certain tasks (and which ones) to bureaucrats.
Economists have emphasized one speci¯c argument in favor of dele-
gationof policy to a non electedbureaucrat: time inconsistency in mone-
tary policy. Rogo® (1985) pointed out how an independent and in°ation
averse central banker not subject to ex post democratic control would
improve social welfare.1 But, as political scientists know well there is
muchmoreto thinkabout. For instance, even¯scal policy is marredwith
a host of time inconsistency problems, but societies seem reluctant to
allocate this policy prerogative to independent bureaucrats. Note, how-
ever, that Blinder (1997) argues that some aspects of ¯scal policy could
be allocated to an independent agency operating like an independent
Central Bank2. An interesting question is why this never happens. An
1See Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) for the "clas-
sic" statement of the time inconsistency problem. Walsh (1995) and Persson and
Tabellini (1993) discussed "contractual" arrangements between popular representa-
tives and independent central bankers. For an empirical discussion of the bene¯ts
of independent central bankers see Grilli Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), Alesina
and Summers (1993) for OECD countries and Cukierman (1992) for a larger sample
of countries.
2. Also the Business Council of Australia (1999) proposed that tax policy in
2ability to commit to a course of action may even be desirable in foreign
policy, which however is always the prerogative of appointed politicians,
at least in the more relevant phase of choosing the general strategy.3
The raise of the regulatory state has made the bureaucracy a key player
in both the decisions and the execution of a large amount of legislation.
Our starting point is the premise that the main di®erence between
politicians and bureaucrats lies in their motivations. Politicians are mo-
tivated by the goal of winning elections. Bureaucrats are motivated by
"career concerns", that is they want to ful¯ll the goals of their organiza-
tion because this improves their professional prospects in the public or
private sector.4 In addition, by appearing competent, the bureaucrat can
guarantee his autonomy and independence. 5 Armed with this premise,
we analyze both a normative and a positive model of task allocation.
In the former a social planner would optimally assign tasks in order to
maximize e±ciency andby optimally using the di®erent incentives of bu-
reaucrats and politicians. In a positive model the politicians themselves
choose when to delegate and the opportunistic motivation of politicians
determines what is delegated. As we show below, the normative and
positive implications for task attribution do not coincide.
We analyze many di®erent types of policies, trying to be reasonably
exhaustive. From a normative perspective, politicians are preferable for
tasks that have the following features: i) di®erences in performance are
due to e®ort, rather than individual talent or technical ability; ii)the
preferences of the public are unstable and uncertain, so that °exibil-
ity is valuable, a case that may be especially relevant for changing and
complex policy environments; iii) time inconsistency is unlikely to be a
relevant issue; iii) the nature of the polciy is such that politicians cannot
strategically distort policy choices in favor of short term objectives and
against long term welfare; iv) the stakes for organized interest groups
are small, or the legal system is poorly designed so that corruption is
widespread; v) side payments to compensate the losers are desirable and
relevant, or bundling of di®erent aspects of policy management and a
comprehensive approach is important. The reverse applies to the attri-
bution of prerogatives to bureaucrats.
When politicians (rather than social planners) choose what to del-
Australia be set by an independent agency within limits imposed by the legislature.
3See Putnam (1988) for a discussion of the role and bene¯ts of commitments in
international relations.
4For a discussion of how bureaucrats are motivated by prospect of career enhance-
ment and this leads them to internalize the goals of the organization, see the classic
treatment in Wilson (1989) especially Chapter 9.
5 See Carpenter (2001) for a discussion of this point.
3egate, the results are quite di®erent. Politicians want to retain those
tasks that are likely to generate large rents, large campaign contribu-
tion or bribes. They are instead more inclined to delegate tasks that are
"risky", inthe sense that they may lead to policy failures: blame shifting
to bureaucrats shields the politician from the risk. Politicians also never
delegate redistributive tasks, because those allow politicians to construct
winning coalitions of voters and lead more easily to electoral victory.
A few examples may clarify some of our points. Monetary policy
involves fairly sophisticated skills, has relatively few distributional con-
sequences (compared to say to ¯scal policy) and social preferences on
what is the appropriate goal of monetary policy are quite stable: at least
ex-ante most people would agree that monetary policy ought to control
in°ation with some room for output stabilization.6 Moreover, politicians
canblame (as they often do) the central bank for downturns in the econ-
omy. Hence, delegation to an independent Central Bank seems desirable
and politically attractive. Incidentally, these arguments provide a ratio-
nale for independent central bankers even for those who do not believe
that time inconsistency of monetary policy is a major problem, such as
Blinder (1999). On the contrary, foreignpolicy is an area whereit is very
di±cult to describe ex ante reasonably precise and ¯xed policy goals; in
a changing world the preferences of the public may change substantially.
Just think of how preferences for foreign policy changed in the US before
and after September 11, 2001. Hence, from a normative perspective, it
should remain under political control. Finally, much of ¯scal policy has
a redistributive nature and could be a source of political rents. Our
positive analysis predicts that politicians will prefer to maintain control
over ¯scal policy, as we normally observe in practice.
Our paper is of course related to the vast political science literature
asking the positive question of why legislative powers are delegated in
practice, what the e®ect of delegation is, the "bureaucratic drift" etc.
6 Obviously monetary police has redistributive consequences as well
(think of debtor and creditors) but at least in recent decades the main
goal of monetary policy is in°ation control and output stabilization.
Often the redistributive consequences of monetary policy are either un-
expected or a source of time inconsistency (think of devaluation of the
public debt).
4- see Epstein and O' Halloran (1999). This literature, mostly focused
on the US, is ¯lled with interesting controversies. Some authors (Lowi
(1969) amongst others) argue that delegation is deleterious, an abdi-
cation of the legislators' responsibility and a way of favoring special
interests (Stigler (1971)). Other authors (Mc Cubbins, Noll and Wein-
gast (1987, 1989)) instead claim that the legislators can, at least up to
a point, control the bureaucratic agencies by means of procedural rules.
Carpenter (2001) dissents and argues instead that the rise of the regu-
latory state has given a large latitude to many bureaucracies to decide
in addition to implement legislation.
But then, if the control of politicians over bureaucrats is imperfect,
that is if the agencies can act following their own motivations, why
delegate at all? One answer is "optimistic" and relates to the need
for division of labor, reduction of e®ort for the legislators etc.. Others
are more cynical: Epstein and O' Halloran (1999) argue that the type
of delegation chosen is the one that maximizes the bene¯ts for elected
politicians rather than social welfare; this is precisely what we model
in the positive part of our paper. Fiorina (1977) points out the blame
shifting role of delegation: politicians delegate to agencies in order to
blame them when things go badly and claim responsibility when success
occurs. We derive this result formally but we point out a trade o®
between using bureaucrats as scapegoat and rent extraction.
Our paper is also related to several recent contributions that have
investigated the role of career concerns rather than explicit contracts.
Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999a,b) discuss the foundations of
this approach and apply it to study the behavior of government agen-
cies. They focus on some issues related to ours, namely the nature and
"fuzziness" of the agencies mission, but they do not contrast bureau-
cratic and political accountability. Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) study
the role of advocates that provide information and opinion to policy-
makers, and discuss how the career concerns of advocates may improve
policymaking. Maskin and Tirole (2001) investigate the attribution of
responsibilities between accountable and non accountable agents. The
latter have intrinsic motivations, while the former seek to please their
principals because of implicit rewards (career concerns). In our set up,
instead, we neglect the role of intrinsic motivations: both bureaucrats
and politicians need to be kept accountable with implicit incentives; but
the implicit incentive schemes can be of two kinds: those that de¯ne a
politician (striving for re-election), and those that de¯ne a bureaucrat
(career concerns). Schultz (2003) contrasts direct democracy, represen-
tative democracy and bureaucratic delegation. Like Maskin and Tirole
(2001), he views bureaucrats as unaccountable and focuses on the trade-
5o® between ideological polarization and accountability: bureaucrats are
less polarized than partisan politicians, but are more in°exible since
they are unacountable and cannot be removed after shocks to the vot-
ers' policy preferences. Besley and Gathak (2003) also study intrinsi-
cally motivated agents, and focus on how to combine intrinsic motiva-
tion with implicit rewards. Besley and Coate (2003) contrast appointed
and elected regulators of public utilities; both policymakers' types are
intrinsically motivated, but direct election allows the voters to unbundle
policy issues.
Another related question is that of privatization of government ac-
tivities. Hart, Shleifer and Vishny ((1997) in particular discuss when it
is preferable to delegate the provision of public goods to private enter-
prises and when to keep it under control of politicians. Issues regarding
incompleteness of the contract between politicians and private providers
have close analogies with some of the questions we address below.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the simplest
case of our model and justi¯es its assumptions. Sections 3 and 4 discuss
cases of policies with a "public good" nature and with no redistribution.
Section 5 reviews the role of bureaucrats in solving time inconsistency
problems and in keeping politicians' short termism under control. Sec-
tions 6,7 and 8 deal with redistribution and with the role of organized
interest groups. Section 9 discusses the positive aspects of our model.
The last section concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a society that has to decide whether to assign a certain policy
to an elected o±cer or to a bureaucrat. With the generic term "poli-
cymaker" we indicate who chooses policy, so he or she can be either a
politician or a bureaucrat. In the simplest possible case we consider a
single policy, the result of which is determined by the e®ort put in by the
policymaker and by his ability. Thus, the policy outcome y is de¯ned as
follows:
y = ￿ + a (1)
where a represents the e®ort of the policymaker and ￿ » N(¹ ￿; ￿2
￿) is his
random ability. Ability and e®ort are additive.7 Citizens care about the
policy outcome according to a well behaved, concave utility function,
7 Alternatively they could be multiplicative leading to more compli-
cated algebra but similar results. See Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole
(1999b).
6U(y): For the moment we consider linear preferences, U(y) = y; since
the strict concavity of the utility function does not a®ect the nature
of the results and simply makes the notation more cumbersome. We
introduce strict concavity later when it matters.
E®ort is costly, and the strictly convex and increasing cost is labelled
C(a). The reward for the policymaker is labelled R(a) and it di®ers
depending on whether the policymaker is a politician or a bureaucrat.
Both of them maximize their utility de¯ned as:
R(a)¡ C(a) (2)
with Ca > 0; Caa > 0 and R(a) to be de¯ned below (subscripts denote
partial derivatives). Note that our model can be restated in terms of
rent extraction instead of e®ort. That is de¯ne a = ¡r where r > 0
are rents and V (r) (with Vr > 0 Vrr < 0 ) as the utility of rents which
would be of course added to R(:). So every time we say below that the
policymakers "chooses how much e®ort to put in" we can reinterpret the
statement as choosing "how much rent to extract." The marginal cost
of e®ort would then play the same role of the marginal bene¯t of rents
in the ¯rst order conditions. We mostly use the e®ort terminology and
notation which is the one most commonly used in the career concern
literature.
The timing is as follows. At the "Constitutional Table" society
chooses who has control rights over the policy (in the simplest case there
is only one, there will be multiple policies later). Then the policymaker
chooses e®ort, a; before knowing his ability, ￿: Finally nature chooses
￿; outcomes are observed and the reward is paid. Irrespective of who
has control rights, only the outcome y is observable by the principals,
not its composition between e®ort and ability. Hence the agent's reward
can only be based on the policy outcome, y: Note that control over a
policy con only be given either to a bureaucrat or to a politician: we do
not allow for joint control over policies, or for some checks and balances
between the two. We return to this issue below, in section 5.
2.1 The bureaucrat
We posit that bureaucrats are motivated by career concerns. That is,
they are concerned with the perception of their ability ￿ in the eyes of
those that may then promote them or o®er them alternative job oppor-
tunities in the private sector. Therefore the bureaucrat's reward is (the
su±x B stands for Bureaucrat):
R
B(a) = E(E(￿ j y)) = E(y ¡a
e) = E(￿ + a ¡ a
e) (3)
where ae is the public's perception of a.
7Equilibrium behavior of the bureaucrat is obtained as follows. First,
compute the ¯rst order condition with respect to e®ort, a; taking the
expected level of e®ort ae as given. Then, impose the equilibrium re-
quirement, that ae = a: By (3) and (2), we obtain:
1 = Ca(a
B) (4)
where aB indicates the equilibrium e®ort of the bureaucrat.
How does this model of bureaucratic behavior di®er from that in-
duced by an optimal contract between the voters and the bureaucrat?
Section1 of the appendix shows that, in this simple environment, it does
not di®er at all (except for the neglect of the bureaucrat's participation
constraint, which throughout the paper we assume is always satis¯ed).
But as the policy environment gets more complicated, as in the follow-
ing sections, career concern incentives do di®er from those of an optimal
contract. Thus, our model of bureaucratic behavior contains some im-
plicit restrictions on the design of bureaucratic institutions. We are not
too apologetic about it, for two reasons. First, as a matter of fact,
bureaucrats are typically not motivated by sharp pecuniary incentives
and complicated contractual arrangements with society. As others have
argued before us, the implicit rewards and the contractual incomplete-
ness o®ered by career concerns seem a better approximation of observed
arrangements, compared to the puri¯ed world of optimal contracts -
see Wilson (1989) and Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999a,b). Sec-
ond, if indeed society could write unrestricted optimal contracts with
its policymakers, then the question of whether political or bureaucratic
delegationis better for the voters wouldbe utterly unininteresting, since
bureaucratic arrangements would always dominate.
2.2 The politician
The politicians's goal is to be reelected and he accomplishes this goal if
y is above a threshold W: We do not allow any career concerns for the
politicians, other than to be reelected. Normalizing to 1 the bene¯ts of
o±ce holding we have (the su±x P stands for Politician):
R
P(a) = Pr(y ¸ W) = 1¡ P(W ¡ a) (5)
where P(W ¡a) = Pr(￿ · W ¡a): We impose rationality of the voters,
so that they expect that the alternative to reelecting the incumbent is
to get another one with average talent, who in equilibrium will put the
same amount of e®ort as the current one. In fact every periodis identical
8and the politician's e®ort choice is made before he observes his talent.8
It follows that:
W = ¹ ￿ + ae (6)
With a normal distribution for ￿; equilibrium e®ort by the politician,
aP; is de¯ned implicitly by the ¯rst order condition:
n(¹ ￿) = Ca(a
P) (7)
where n(¹ ￿) = 1=￿￿
p
2… is the density of the normal distribution of ￿
evaluated at its mean.
How does the e®ortof thepolitician compare withthatof thebureau-
crat? Comparing (4) and (7), we see that the answer is ambiguous and
depends on parameters' values. Note that aP > aB does not automati-
cally imply that the politician unambiguously dominates the bureaucrat
from the voters' perspective, however. Thereason is that the equilibrium
e®ort of the bureaucrat here coincides with the ¯rst best. Hence, the
bureaucrat can be worse than the politician only if it earns rents (i.e., if
the bureaucrat's participation constraint does not bind, as discussed in
section 1 of the appendix). In this case, and if political delegation does
not violate the incentive constraint, then whenever aP > aB the voters
are better o® under the politician than under the bureaucrat.
2.3 Discussion
It is important to pause to discuss how these strawmen "politicians" and
"bureaucrats" relate to real world cases. Probably the most compelling
example of a "bureaucrat" as modelled here is a Central Banker. His
incentives to ful¯ll his ask are mostly driven by the desire to appear
competent, even though even a Central Banker occasionally may bend
8 Note that the model could be easily generalized to several periods,
if the politician's ability today is a signal of his ability tomorrow but
some random element of ability is present every period so that it can
never be fully learnt in advance. A widely studied case in the political
business ccycle literature is that of a MA (1) process for abiity. Persson
and Tabellini (2000) discuss the implications of this political model more
extensively.
9to the electoral needs of a "politician". Like our "bureaucrat", a Central
Banker sets policy without political interferences and his tasks are set by
a clear mandate to keep in°ation low. An American President is instead
the quintessential example of a politician, seeking reelection for himself
in his ¯rst term and for his party in his second.9 The paper can be
viewed as asking the following questions: should institutional arrange-
ments such as those relating to monetary policy with an independent
Central Bank be extended to other areas of policymaking? And when
are such arrangements likely to be chosen by opportunistic politicians?
Inpracticebureaucrats inchargeofimportantagenciesmaybeprepar-
ing a leap into politics, so they may worry about their popularity and
not only their competence per se. On the contrary, politicians may look
ahead to a career in the private sector. While these caveats point to a
large gray area and intermediate cases between our "politician" and our
"bureaucrat", it is useful as a ¯rst step to clearly identify how career
concerns and electoral incentives lead to di®erent result depending on
the nature of the policy in question.
3 Imperfect monitoring
We now move to the case of imperfect monitoring, that is a situation in
which performance is not perfectly observable. Thus, we add noise, ";
besides talent (￿) and e®ort (a) :
y = ￿ +" + a
with " » N(0; ￿2
"); uncorrelated with ￿ and unobservable. Only perfor-
mance y is observed and can be the basis of rewards.
In this case the reward for bureaucrats can be rewritten as:
RB(a) = E(E(￿ j y)) = ¹ ￿ + ﬂE(￿ + " +a ¡ ae ¡ ¹ ￿) (8)
where ﬂ = ￿2
￿=(￿2
￿ + ￿2
") < 1. Given our assumption of normality of the
distributions, we obtain a well known signal extraction result. Now the
perception of talent is "discounted" by a term ﬂ which re°ects the signal
to noise ratio. In equilibrium the choice of the bureaucrat is given by:
ﬂ = Ca(aB) (9)
9 See Alesina and Spear (1988) for a formal discussion of how a party
may create incentive for a second year President to behave as if he were
interested in reelection and avoid a "last period" problem.
10Not surprisingly, the bureaucrat puts in less e®ort the lower is the signal
to noise ratio.
Note that, with imperfect monitoring, the career concern contract no
longer induces the optimal amount of e®ort. Given risk neutrality, the
optimal contract (under the assumption that the principal only observes
y) would still induce the same amount of e®ort as in (4) above - see also
section 1 of the appendix. That is, imperfect monitoring would not add
any distortions. But if the bureaucrat can only be rewarded implicitly
throughcareerconcerns, aswe assume, then imperfectmonitoringentails
a loss of welfare for the voters.
We now turn to political delegation. The politician's reward is given
by the same expression as above, except that now the distribution from
whichthe probability Pr(y ¸ W) canbe computedhas a larger variance,
that re°ects both the variance of ￿ and of ". It is immediate to derive
the ¯rst order condition of the politician as follows:
n(¹ ￿;0) = Ca(a
P)






2…) is the density of the random variable
￿ + "; evaluated at the mean of both ￿ and ":
We are now ready to establish the following
Proposition 1 The comparison between aP and aB is ambiguous. Im-
perfect monitoring (high ￿2
") reduces e®ort for both types of policy-
makers. Higher ￿2
￿ increases aB but decreases aP:
Therefore, less monitoring does not favor one or the other type of
policymakers. This result is related to those obtained by Dewatripont,
Jewitt and Tirole (1999b), who also point out that performance less
closely tied to talent or e®ort weakens the incentives of agents motivated
by career concerns. But note that the same conclusions also apply to
a politician. Hence, imperfect monitoring reduces the performance of
both policymaker types (relative to an optimal contract), but it does
not provide an argument for preferring a politician to a bureaucrat at
the constitutional stage.
More uncertainty about the policymaker ability, however, does fa-
vor the bureaucrat over the politician. With imperfect monitoring a
larger variance of ￿ actually increases e®ort of the bureaucrat, while
it has the opposite e®ect on the politician. Intuitively, an increase in
the variance of ￿ increases the signal-to-noise ratio and implies that ob-
served performance (y) is a better indicator of ability (￿): This makes
thebureaucrat work harder, since by assumptionhe fully internalizes the
11bene¯t of higher expected ability.10 The politician, instead, only wants
to overcome the re-election threshold (giving the voters more than their
reservation utility is a waste). If ability is more uncertain (if ￿2
￿ is high),
then re-election prospects are less sensitive to e®ort, since more of the
policy outcomeis due torandomness. Hence his incentives areweakened.
This result has a practical and sensible implication: bureaucrats are
better than politicians in tasks requiring special abilities or technical
competence, that not everyone is likely to have. The reason is not that
bureaucrats are more gifted than politicians, but rather that they have
stronger incentives to pretend that they are gifted.11 This implication is
strengthened if evaluating the performance of a bureaucrat also requires
10 Here the bureaucrat is risk neutral, which means that his compensa-
tion is a linear function of expectedability (conditional on performance).
A risk averse bureaucrat would put in even more e®ort with more un-
certainty over ￿, if his marginal utility was convex (eg. with iso-elastic
utility function, as in the literature on precautionary savings). This
would further increase his attractiveness relative to the politician. But
the opposite would be true if the bureacrat's marginal utility was con-
cave (in this case more uncertainty over ￿ could weaken the bureaucrat
incentives, if the e®ect on marginal utility outweighs the e®ect on the
signal to noise ratio).
11 This result would be reinforced if the extent to which bureaucratic
ability is rewarded was also allowed to vary. Tasks where technical abil-
ities matter more are also those for which rewards for ability are higher.
For instance, being a good central banker also entails ability in fore-
casting; if this talent is highly rewarded in the market place, this is an
additional reason to delegate monetary policy to a bureaucrat (since it
12special technical abilities - that is, if the extent of imperfect monitoring
also depends on who does the monitoring. In the case of politicians, the
ultimate judges of performance are the voters at large. The performance
of bureaucrats, instead, is mainly evaluated by their professional peers.
Hence, imperfect monitoring is less of a problem if politicians are given
simple tasks, since bureaucrats can more easily be held accountable by
their peers for more technically demanding tasks. Maskin and Tirole
(2001) and Epstein and O' Halloran (1999) reach a similar conclusion in
di®erent models.
4 Policy tasks in an uncertain world
We now add an element of uncertainty in tasks. In particular, suppose
that at the Constitutional Table voters are not sure of how their pref-
erences will evolve. We return to the case of perfect monitoring and we
assume that there are two possible policies, that is two di®erent direc-
tions in which e®ort can be devoted to: yi = ￿ +ai; with i = 1;2:12
With multiple tasks, which will be our focus from now on, one
needs to specify a general cost function with multiple arguments, C =
C(a1;a2): Instead of using the general formulation, we simplify to ei-
ther an additive case (C = C(a1 +a2); where e®ort in the various tasks
is perfectly substitutable in the cost function, or to a separable case
(C = C(a1) + C(a2)), where the marginal cost of e®ort in one task
is totally independent of e®ort devoted to the other tasks. We choose
the simplest formulation that does not produce knife-hedge or "trivial"
results. The more general speci¯cation of costs generates qualitatively
similar results. We begin in this section by considering additive costs,
so that C = C(a1 +a2).
At theConstitutional Table the (identical)voters areuncertainabout
their ex post preferences over alternative policies, so that voters utility
is now given by the following concave function:
U(‚y1 + (1¡ ‚)y2) (10)
with ‚ = 1 with probability q > 1=2; ‚ = 0 with probability (1 ¡ q):
gives a stronger incentive to appear a talented bureaucrat).
12 For a general discussion of multi task functions in a principal- agent
relationship see Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). They analyze situa-
tions in which incentive schemes need to account for the optimal alloca-
tion of e®ort in di®erent tasks.
13Thus, society does not know ex ante what it will like ex post; but there
is no disagreement ex post amongst members of society. Disagreements
and redistribution will be analyzed below. The timing is now as follows.
First, at the Constitutional Table the voters choose whether to assign
this policy to a bureaucrat or to a politician, then nature chooses ‚;
that is social preferences are determined. Then the policymaker chooses
[ai]; then nature chooses ￿; and ¯nally policy is determined and rewards
paid. We assume that ‚ is observable but not veri¯able.13
Choosing a non-elected bureaucrat means that voters decide at the
Constitutional Table to assign a task to the bureaucrat. Given that at
the Constitutional Table preferences are not yet known, one can only
assign to the bureaucrat an unconditional task de¯ned as follows:
y = –y1+ (1¡ –)y2 (11)
where – is a parameter speci¯ed by the Constitution. A crucial assump-
tion is that the parameter – cannot be contingent on the realization of
the random variable ‚ : the mission for the bureaucrat cannot be con-
tingent on the realization of ex post voters' preferences. This element
of contract incompleteness is plausible: A bureaucrat is somebody who
is not appointed through the political process, and therefore he will not
follow the ebb and °ows of changing voters' preferences. The indepen-
dence of the Central Bank, for instance, means that the central banker
does not have to respond to the voters or even their representatives for
his policy choices, other than for how he ful¯lls the goals assigned by
the law to the central bank. But these goals can only be formulated in
a simple and general way, like keep in°ation under control; the central
bank objectives cannot be changed with electoral results, or with the
stage of the business cycle.14
Under these assumptions, the rewards of the bureaucrats are:
R
B(a) = E(E(￿ j y)) = E(￿ + –a1+ (1 ¡ –)a2 ¡ –a
e
1 ¡ (1¡ –)a
e
2) (12)
13 Aghion Alesina and Trebbi (2002) also study of constitutional design
in a case in which social preferences are not fully revealed ex ante. Their
model and their emphasis is however quite di®erent.
14 See AlesinaandGatti (1995) for anexplicit discussionofinsulationof
themissions assignedtothe central bank form changes in the preferences
of the electorate.
14Given additive costs and q > 1=2; it is optimal to set – = 1:15 The ¯rst




2 = 0 (13)
That is the bureaucrat focuses all his e®ort on the "main" activity of his
mandate because that is more helpful in signaling his ability. Thus, the
voters' utility in equilibrium is given by:
U
B = qEU(￿ +a
B
1) + (1¡ q)EU(￿) (14)
The key here is that by choosing a bureaucrat who is non responsive to
the ebb and °ows of society's preferences, citizens are "stuck" with the
risk that e®ort is misallocated and the bureaucrat pursues the wrong
goals, those that ex-ante seem more likely to be relevant.
This is what di®erentiates the politician from the bureaucrat. The
politician's goals always depend on the realization of ‚ (i.e., on the
preferences of the voters). Thus, knowing ‚ the politician will devote
e®ort only to the task preferred ex post by the voters according to a ¯rst
order condition similar to (7) above. The following proposition follows.
Proposition 2 The politician always chooses the right task from the
voters' perspective. This advantage of the politician is more im-
portant the more risk averse are the voters and the more uncertain
are their ex-post preferences.
Delegation to bureaucrats is safe when society's preferences are well
known and stable. But when they change, the "rigidity" of a bureau-
crat's behavior makes the latter much less attractive. This helps us to
understand why monetary policy is often delegated to an independent
central bank, while foreign policy is typically under the control of politi-
cians. Few would disagree with the statement that the appropriate goal
for monetary policy is to keep in°ation under control with some room
for stabilization policy; and this goal is unlikely to change over time.
But preferences regarding foreign policy are unlikely to be stable and
15 If costs were separable, then the optimal – would be increasing with
q; at a rate that is decreasing with the curvature of U(:) for obvious
reason having to do with risk aversion. The qualitative nature of our
result would not change.
15unchanged, and as a result an appropriate simple bureaucratic goal can-
not be stated once and for all. The politician, instead, always ¯nds it
optimal to follow the ebbs and°ows of voters' preferences. In a changing
world, this feature of political accountability may be superior to a ¯xed
and unchangeablebureaucraticmission. This is consistent with Wilson's
(1989) view that it would be impossible to delegate foreign policy to a
non political agency because it wouldbe toocomplicated to specify tasks
in such an area of policymaking so much a®ected by unexpected contin-
gencies. Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) make a similar argument to
clarify why it would be close to impossible to privatize foreign policy.
In these situations, a combination of politicians and bureaucrats
could be welfare improving. In fact, a natural remedy to the "narrow-
mindedness" of bureaucrats pursuing the wrong task is to let the politi-
cian decide the mission of the bureaucrat. Speci¯cally, the constitution
couldprescribe that policy be delegated toa bureaucrat, but the bureau-
crat's mission (the parameter – in (11) above) be chosen by a politician.
If the politician observes the contingency ‚ and if he is held accountable
by thevotersas describedintheprevious section, he wouldalways choose
the socially optimal mission for the bureaucrat. This division of tasks
(the politician assigns the bureaucrat some goals and the latter chooses
the instruments with which to pursue them) is observed in a variety of
real world arrangements. An example is the in°ation targeting regime
in the UK, where the government periodically assigns an in°ation target
to the Bank of England and then it does not interfere with the central
bank decisions of how to pursue that target. Ofcourse, the precisionand
frequency with which the goals of the bureaucrat are de¯ned can vary
from case to case, and determine the extent to which an independent
bureaucrat is really in charge of policy decisions, (rather than taking or-
ders from the politician). In some cases it may be impossible to delegate
in any meaningful way simply because the contingencies to specify in
the principal agent relationship between politician and bureaucrats are
simply too complex.
5 Time inconsistency
The bene¯t of °exibility associated with political delegation has a cost,
when society's preferences are time inconsistent. The rigidity of bu-
reaucratic control, instead, o®ers protection against time inconsistency.
Delegation to an independent agency to gain credibility is extensively
used in monetary policy (as captured by Rogo® (1985)). Our model
o®ers a di®erent formalization of this point.
Suppose, again, that there are two tasks, i = 1;2; say ¯ghting un-
employment (task 1) and ¯ghting in°ation (task 2). Citizens care about
16both tasks, with simple linear preferences:
U(y1;y2) = y1 +y2 (15)
E®ectivein°ationcontrol dependsonthepolicymaker's e®ortandability,
y2 = ￿+a2: But equilibrium unemployment also depends on unexpected
in°ation, ae
2. Speci¯cally, suppose that the policy outcome in task 1
(¯ghting unemployment) is given by:
y1 = ￿ +a1 ¡ (a2 ¡ a
e
2) (16)
Thus, low unemployment is brought about by ability ande®ort in choos-
ing the right labor market policies (a1+￿), but it is also facilitated by an
unexpectedly high level of in°ation. Other examples canbe thought, but
whatever the precise economic interpretation, in this model the ¯nal out-
comedepends on the interaction betweenthepolicymakers' decisionsand
the private sector expectations, and this creates a time inconsistency.
Suppose throughout that policy commitments are unavailable, mean-
ing that ¯rst private expectations are formed, and then e®ort in both
tasks, a1 and a2, are chosen. One can show (see the Appendix for the
derivation) that politicians are much more likely to fall into the traps of
time inconsistency, compared to bureaucrats. The goals of a politician
are unavoidably linked to the ex-post welfare of voters, through reelec-
tion motives. The bureaucrat instead can be given an explicit mission,
possibly di®erent from whatever is ex-post optimal for the voters. This
possibility of strategic delegation enables society to overcome credibil-
ity problems. This conclusion is essentially the same as Rogo® (1985).
But our framework shows more clearly another bene¯t of bureaucratic
delegation: it allows separation of tasks. By holding the central bank
accountable only for in°ation, and by giving the politician the responsi-
bility to ¯ght unemployment, the time inconsistency no longer distorts
the policymakers' incentives. In the Appendix we show more precisely
the following:
Proposition 3 Undertime inconsistency, the bureaucrat generallydoes
better than the politician, for two reasons: ¯rst, the mission of a
bureaucrat can be narrowlyde¯ned to avoid time inconsistent goals;
second, even if this cannot be achieved because tasks cannot be split
among separate agencies, the missionof a bureaucrat can be de¯ned
strategically to in°uence private sector expectations, irrespective of
what is ex-post optimal for society.
A related issue has to do with the time dimension of the °ow of costs
17and bene¯ts of di®erent policy tasks.16 Bureaucrats tend to care more
about the long run consequences of policies, compared to politicians,
for two reasons. First, often bureaucrats are appointed for longer than
electoral cycles, precisely to avoid short termist policies.17 Second, even
when bureaucrats have short terms of o±ce, the blame for myopic poli-
cies may reach them and hurt them later on. This gives bureaucrats a
strong incentive to focus on the long term goal. A politician instead is
often interested in winning the next elections and is less worried about
repercussions later on in his career. In future elections the main issues
at hand may be di®erent and the voters may forget past policy mistakes.
Thus, thereis an argument for assigning to bureaucrats policy tasks that
imply short term costs and/or delayed bene¯ts.18
When the short termism of politicians is an issue, the interaction
between bureaucrats and politicians can yield welfare improvements. To
achieve this, we don't need to put the bureaucrat in charge of policy
decisions. It is enough that he knows something about what the politi-
cian is doing and acts as a watchdog, conveying his information to the
voters. The voters' behavior will then endogenously adjust to induce an
opportunistic politician to pursue long term goals. In our framework,
the voters do not deliberately punish the politician if he acts myopically.
But they do so indirectly, when they exploit the bureaucrat announce-
ment to better understand what the politician is really doing and use
16 Rogo® (1990), Rogo® and Sibert (1988) and Persson and Tabellini
(1990 and 2000) model myopic electoral cycles in monetary and ¯scal
policy with rational voters.
17 Long terms of o±ce for the Chairman of the Central Bank are con-
sidered a necessary tool to insure independence and a long term horizon
in the conduct of monetary policy.
18 Besley and Coate (2003) ¯nd evidence that, in US states, elected
regulators tend to keep lower electricity prices compared to appointed
regulators. If, as likely, lower prices come at the expenses of lower in-
vestments, this ¯nding is consistent with the prediction of short-termism
by elected (as opposed to appointed) regulators.
18this information to reappoint the incumbent only if he is competent
enough.19
Watchdogs of this type are especially useful to check the govern-
ment budget. Issues of creativeaccounting, or unsustainable ¯scal policy
"hiding" mounting de¯cits in the social security account, are common
examples of short termist behavior that could be °agged by watchdogs.
The Stability and Growth Pact, which puts limits on budget de¯cits of
governments of the European Union and is "enforced" by the EU Com-
mission, exploits this role of bureaucrats. Even though national gov-
ernments may have violated the de¯cit ceilings without incurring in the
¯nes envisaged by the Pact, the bureaucrats' indications of a violation
has raised the voters' attention to issues of excessive de¯cits. European
bureaucrats do not control national de¯cits, but by raising "°ags" they
nevertheless exert a strong in°uence on national policies.
6 Lobbying and bribing
We now turn to policies which imply con°icts amongst di®erent mem-
bers of society, broadly speaking redistributive policies with winners and
losers. In this section we consider the case of lobbies that can in°uence
the choice of policies with bribes or campaign contributions. Thus here
"redistribution" is intended as favors towards powerful minorities. The
minority will seek to in°uence policy decisions to obtain favors. Both
the politician and the bureaucrat can be captured by the interest group,
but with di®erent mechanisms. This di®erence can give raise to a consti-
tutional preference for one or the other type of policymaker, depending
on the circumstances.
There are two tasks, i = 1;2; both a®ected linearly by e®ort and
ability, with no spillover e®ects across tasks: yi = ￿ + ai: The cost of
e®ort is non-separable: C = C(a1 + a2). Task 1 bene¯ts the voters at
large, while task 2 only bene¯ts a small but organized interest group.
Voters in°uence policy only through elections. The organized interest
group can in°uence policy either through bribes, b; or through campaign
contributions, f. Thus, the preferences of voters are just y1; while those
of the interest group can be written as:
(1+ ￿)y2 ¡ b¡ f (17)
where ￿ is a parameter capturing the intensity of the group's preferences
for task 2.
19 In a previous version of this paper we work out this argument more
formally. The derivation is available from the authors.
19Bribes can be o®ered to both the politician and the bureaucrat, but
are illegal. Thus, if a policymaker accepts a bribe, with some exogenous
probability q he is caught and pays a ¯ne Z (the interest group is not
¯ned). Campaign contributions are legal and can only be o®ered to the
politician. The e®ect of campaign contributions is to increase the incum-
bent's chances of winning the elections. We model this by saying that
the voters' reservation utility is a decreasing function of the campaign
contributions collected by the incumbent:
W = ¹ ￿ + a
e
1 ¡ H(f) (18)
where the function H(:) captures the e®ect of campaign contributions.
It is natural to assume that H(0) = 0; Hf > 0; Hff < 0: Note that we
are assuming that the lobby group is very small and therefore irrelevant
from a vote counting point of view. Under these assumptions, we can
write the policymaker's preferences as:
R(y1;y2) ¡ C(a1 + a2) + (1¡ `)b ¡ qZ (19)
where R(y1;y2) are the policymaker's rewards (RB(y1;y2) = E(￿=y1)
for the bureaucrat, RP(y1;y2) = Pr(y1 ¸ W) for the politician), and
1 > ` > 0 denotes transaction costs that reduce the value of the bribe
for the recipient relative to the amount paid by the interest group. The
policymaker's e®ort devotedto task 2 is observable by theinterest group,
so that bribes and campaign contributions can be contingent upon the
policymaker e®ort: b = B(a2), f = F(a2): The timing of events is as fol-
lows. First the Constitution allocates control rights over policies. Then
the organized group commits to bribes and or campaign contributions,
as a function of e®ort. Next, the policymaker allocates e®ort between
the two tasks. Nature then chooses a realization of ￿: Finally, rewards
are paid.
This is a common agency game, with two types of principals: the in-
terest group and the representative voter. The interest group has all the
commitment power and can either in°uence the agent directly (through
bribes), or indirectly (through campaign contributions). The distinc-
tion between the politician and the bureaucrat is that the latter can
only be in°uenced by the interest group through bribes. We want to
know whether the voters are better o® with the bureaucrat or with the
politician, and what in°uences this comparison.
6.1 Bribing the bureaucrat
If the constitution gave all control rights to the bureaucrat we would
have a standard common agency game, with a single active lobby. If
20bribes are positive, then the equilibrium must be jointly optimal for the
organized group and the politician. This immediately implies:
aB
1 = 0; aB
2 = C¡1
a (1+ ￿) (20)
Moreover, restricting attention to truthful contribution (here brib-
ing) schedules, the equilibrium bribing schedule has the following simple
form:20




where the constant ¹ B is chosen by the organized group so as to leave the
bureaucrat indi®erent between accepting or rejecting the bribe. Given
the bureaucrat's preferences, this implies:
¹ B = C(a
B




1 ¡ (1+ ￿)a
B
2 + ¹ qZ (22)
whereaB
1 = C¡1
a (1) denotes theequilibriumpolicy ifnobribeis accepted.
Finally, the organized group must also prefer to pay the bribe rather
than be passive. This in turn puts an upper bound on the constant ¹ B
that the organized interest group is willing to pay. Taking into account
















¸ ¹ qZ (23)
If instead this condition is violated, then the equilibrium with the bu-
reaucrat delivers the optimal policy for the voters. Equation (23) makes
it clear that an equilibrium in which the bureaucrat is bribed is more
likely if the stakes for the organized group are high (￿ is large), or if the
legal system works poorly (qZ and ` are small).
6.2 Lobbying the politicians
Next, suppose that the politician is in charge of the policy decision. A
condition very similar to (23) above determines the existence of an equi-
librium with bribes (the expression is not identical because the politi-
cian's reward occurs through reappointment). In particular, it remains
true that bribes would be zero if the legal system is strong, so that trans-
action costs are high or the probability of being caught is high. But now,
besides bribes, the organized interest group can also resort to campaign
contributions. He will choose to do so if campaign contributions are
su±ciently e®ective in swaying the voters.
20 See Grossman and Helpman (2001).
21Speci¯cally, in an equilibrium with campaign contributions, the allo-
cation of e®ort must be jointly optimal for the politician and the orga-
nizedgroup. Thus, the equilibrium must solve thefollowing optimization
problem by choice of a1;a2 and f; subject to non-negativity constraints





Pr(￿ ¸ ¹ ￿ +a
e
1¡ a1¡ H(f)) +(1 +￿)a2 ¡ C(a1 + a2) ¡ f
ª
(24)
The properties of the solution to this problem depend on the slope
of the function H(f); i.e., on how e®ective campaign contributions are
in swaying the voters. In the Appendix we consider two cases:
First, if Hf(0) < 1=(1+ ￿); then the equilibrium has zero lobbying
(f = 0) and the outcome is optimal for the voters (aP
2 = 0): In this case,
campaign contributions cannot be productive enough, andthe organized
group will not seek to in°uence the politician: the group's stakes are
too low relative to how much he would have to pay into the electoral
campaign of the politician.
The opposite extreme occurs if Hf(f¤) > 1=(1 + ￿); where f¤ de-
notes equilibrium campaign contributions, to be de¯ned below. In this
case, campaign contributions are very e®ective at the margin. E®ort
is allocated so as to please only the organized group, as in (20) above.
And equilibrium campaign contributions are de¯ned implicitly by the
optimality condition:
n(¹ ￿ ¡ H(f¤))¢ Hf(f¤) = 1 (25)
where n(x) is the normal density of ￿ evaluated at the point x: For this
to be an equilibrium, the organized group must bene¯t relative to the
option of not lobbying at all, and this also requires: (1 +￿)aP
2 ¸ f¤:
We summarize this discussion in the following:
Proposition 4 Political lobbying can be an equilibrium, even if bribes
to the bureaucrat are not. This is more likely if campaign contri-
butions are e®ective in in°uencing the voters, but the legal system
is strong and e®ective in discouraging bribes.
Thus, politically appointed policymakers are more easily captured by
organized interests compared to bureaucrats, particularly in advanced
democracies with a well functioning legal system. The reason is that,
to in°uence a politician, the interest group needs to convince the voters
that the politician is doing a good job and deserves to be reelected. The
politician will then automatically respond with policy favors to the in-
terest group, since this will help his chances of reelection. To in°uence
22a bureaucrat, instead, the organized group needs to engage in illegal or
semi-legal activities, and ¯ght against possibly deeply entrenched pro-
fessional goals and standards of a technical bureaucracy. Policies where
the stakes for organized interests are very high, or where redistributive
con°icts concern small but powerful vested interests against the voters
at large, may thus be more safely left in the hands of the bureaucrat.
The regulation of public utilities is a typical example: the long run in-
terests of consumers are easy to identify and the stakes for the utilities'
supplier are very high, so that a politician may be more easily captured
than an independent regulator.21
Note that this result points to an important di®erence between ad-
vanced and less advanced societies. In advanced societies with a well
functioning judicial system, it is relatively easy to enforce the no bribe
equilibrium, but campaign contributions may still be very e®ective at
buying policies; hence, bureaucratic delegation works well. In develop-
ing countries, instead, stopping bribes might be close to impossible and
politicians are likely to do as good a job as bureaucrats.22
7 Compensation of losers
One critical task for politicians is to form coalitions in favor of certain
policies, compensating losers either with direct transfers or by bundling
several policies into one package. To illustrate this point, we need a
con°ict ofinterestbetween voters (orgroups ofvoters)andthepossibility
of side payments and of bundling policies with complementarities.
Voters' utility now depends on the policy outcome and the transfer
(positive or negative) received by the government. We have two voters
(or homogeneous groups of voters of equal size) with concave utility
de¯ned over private consumption, U(ci); i = 1;2 and where:
21 This normative argument in favor of bureaucrats is mitigated if they
are easier to bribe than the politician., however. And bureaucrats with
technical expertise may be more easily bribed than politicians through
a "revolving door policy" - i.e. at the end of their public services poli-
cymakers are o®ered lucrative jobs in the private sector.
22 Glaser and Shleifer (2003) reach a similar conclusion, using a di®er-
ent analytical framework.
23c1 = y1 +t; c2 = y2 ¡ t; y2 ¸ t ¸ ¡y1 (26)
Therefore t is a direct lump sum transfer between voters and the gov-
ernment budget is balanced; there are no tax distortions. Each group
bene¯ts from di®erent tasks requiring speci¯c and uncorrelated abilities,
￿i; i = 1;2: Let the distribution of ￿i have the same densities n(:) and cu-
mulative distributions N(:) (not necessarily normal). There are random
negative spillovers between the two tasks, such that:
y1 = ￿1 + a1 ¡ ‚•a2; y2 = ￿2 + a2 ¡ (1¡ ‚)•a1 (27)
The parameter 0 < • < 1 denotes the strength of the negative spillover
e®ects. Who is hurt by the spillovers is ex ante uncertain. Thus, ‚ is
a random variable that can equal 1 or 0 with equal probabilities. As
in section 4, we assume that ‚ is observable but it is not veri¯able, so
that the bureaucrat's mission cannot be de¯ned contingent on ‚. Thus,
the policymaker maximizes its usual payo®s, with di®erent rewards for
the two types of policymakers, except that now we assume that the cost
function is additive in the two e®orts:
R(a1;a2) ¡ C(a1)¡ C(a2) (28)
Timing has the usual structure. First nature sets ‚ and this deter-
mines which group is hurt by the spillover e®ect. Then the policymaker
chooses ai and t; nature sets ￿i and rewards are paid.
Consider the politician ¯rst. He maximizes reelection probabilities,
which means that he has to win the favor of a strict majority of voters.
Here this means winning the votes of both groups (as it will be clear be-
low, nothing of substance hinges on the fact that in this simple example
reelection requires pleasing all voters). Therefore:
RP(a1;a2) = Prob(U(c1) 1 W1) ¤Prob(U(c2) 1 W2) (29)
where Wi is the reservation utility of group i.
Suppose for concreteness that ‚ = 1: If the two reservation utilities







where x1 = U¡1(W)¡t¡a1+•a2 and x2 = U¡1(W)+t¡a2: That is, the
politician equalizes the "hazard rates" of losing votes from either group.
In this context, the hazard rate measures the elasticity of the probability
of winning with respect to transfers. Thus, this optimality condition is
24similar to the Ramsey rule of optimal taxation: transfers are allocated
between groups so as to equalize this elasticity across groups. If the
hazard rate is monotonically increasing in x; and given the assumption
of the same distribution for ￿i; i = 1;2; equation (30) implies c1 = c2:23
That is, the politician implements full insurance, fully compensating
the losers from the negative externality (remember that compensations
are costless, if they entailed a transaction cost or a tax distortion the
equalization of utilities would no be complete).
Exploiting (30), the optimality conditions for the allocation of e®ort
to the two tasks imply:
n(1¡ N2)=Ca(aP
1) (31)
n(1 ¡ N1)(1¡ •)=Ca(a
P
2)
Thus, the politician allocates e®ort "correctly", in the sense of devoting
more e®ort to the task that does not have negative spillovers: aP
1 > aP
2
if ‚ = 1: Comparing (31) with (7) in section 2, however, we see that the
politician is induced to put less e®ort also in the task with no negative
externality (task 1), relative to the simple case of only one task. The
reason is that bundling of two tasks requiring di®erent abilities weakens
his incentives. His likelihood of reelection now depends on his success in
both tasks. Even if he puts a lot of e®ort in task 1, he could still loose
the election because he happens to be unable in task 2. His awareness
of this risk (captured by the term (1¡N2) on the left hand side of (31)),
dilutes his incentives.24
Let's now turn to the bureaucrat. By assumption, the measure of
performance that he is assigned (and on the basis of which is career-
incentives are determined) cannot be contingent on ‚ and has to be
stated at the Constitutional Table. The natural measure of performance
in this context is total output, (y1+y2): If giventhis goal, the bureaucrat






Nevertheless, compensating transfers will be set to zero.25
23 A uniform distribution of ￿ satis¯es the assumption of a monotoni-
cally increasing hazard rate, for instance.
24 Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Seabright (1996) elaborate further
on this point comparing centralized vs decentralized arrangements.
25 Implicitly, therefore, we are also assuming that social welfare
25Comparing the politician and the bureaucrat, we thus have:
Proposition 5 The politicianprovides side payment tocompensate losers
but has weaker incentives than the bureaucrat; the latter, however, does
not compensate losers.
This result relies on the fact that bureaucrats cannot be given state
contingent missions, and if their goal is formulated in terms of aggre-
gate e±ciency, they will neglect the distributional consequences of their
actions. A politician instead can take advantage of relatively complex
and evolving spillovers between issues and build majorities with com-
plex side payments schemes. Compensating the losers makes it easier
to pass legislation while at the same time providing insurance against
bad luck. Imagine a policy that favors a large majority, say a badly
needed highway, but that creates losers, say the property owners. Under
democratic choice, the losers might be able to block the project. But the
politician can put together a package of compensation for the property
owners, with large bene¯t for the majority. In a sense this is almost
what describes the job of a politician. Instead, it is hard to imagine how
a bureaucrat might do that. How can one write on paper what a bureau-
crat is allowed to do or not do, to create bundling and compensation? A
bureaucrat can be delegated the task of building the best possible high-
way and he may potentially do a better job than the politician; but he
may not have the ability, interest or authority to provide compensation
to the local owners. Note also that "writing some checks" to compensate
groups of losers does not require any particular technical competence,
another reason why it may be di±cult to generate the correct incentives
for career-concerned bureaucrats. This observation leads us directly into
the next section.
8 Splitting the cake
We now consider a purely redistributive policy, "cake splitting". Con-
sider three voters, the minimum number required to make the problem
interesting. The policy task delivers a "cake" that can be divided be-
tween the three voters, therefore:
y = ￿ +a = c1 + c2 + c3 (33)
(U(c1)+ U(c2)) cannot be speci¯ed as the bureaucrats' mission because
it is too vague a concept, or cannot be observed by outsiders to infer the
bureaucrats' talent.
26The utility function of the voters is concave, U(cJ); J = 1;2;3. We start
with risk neutrality, U(cJ) = cJ, and comment below on how the results
would change with risk averse voters.
The key di®erence between a politician and a bureaucrat is, once
again, that the former needs a majority to win and the latter simply
wants to signal talent. Consider the bureaucrat ¯rst. At the constitu-
tional stage, the bureaucrat can either be given no redistributive tasks,
in whichcase redistribution is entirely arbitrary - wecall this an"unfair"
bureaucrat. Alternatively, behind a veil of ignorance he can be assigned
the task of redistributing equally, that is y=3 for all three voters - we
refer to this case as a "fair" bureaucrat. But irrespective of whether he
is "fair" or "unfair" (i.e., of how he splits the cake), his talent is still
judged by the aggregate measure of performance, y; not by how he re-
distributes. His ¯rst order conditions are thus identical to those in (4),
section 2.
Next, consider the politician. Since he only needs to please a ma-
jority, he gives y=2 to two voters and zero to the third one. Hence, his
reward is:
RP(a) = Prob(y=2 ¸ W) (34)
where W is the reservation utility of individual voters. Implicit in (34) is
the assumption that voters expect that the incumbent, if re-elected, will
maintain the same redistribution observed today - i.e he will split the
cake in half between the voters who re-elect him. With forward looking
and rational voters, W equals the average expected utility they canget if
the opponent is elected. If the hypothetical redistribution implemented
by the opponent is unknown, then W = 1=3(￿+ae). Going through the
usual steps, of maximizing with respect to e®ort for given expectations








where n(x) denotes the normal density evaluated at the point x: Com-
paring (35) with (7) in section 2, we see that once the politician is also
in charge of redistribution, he can get away with less equilibrium e®ort,
compared to the case of no redistribution. The reason is that here he
only needs to please two voters out of three. He can thus reduce e®ort,
and still please two voters with the portion of the cake taken away from
the minority.26 Note the asymmetry: voters expect the incumbent to
preserve the observed redistribution over time, but they are uncertain
26 This result is similar to that obtainedin Ferejohn(1986)andPersson
27about how the opponent would redistribute. This asymmetry creates an
incumbency advantage and dilutes the politician's incentives: the voters
are more willing to reappoint the incumbent even if he is incompetent,
because they bene¯t from his redistribution.27 Here we assumed a very
stark asymmetry: no uncertainty at all about how the incumbent will
redistribute, and maximal uncertainty about the opponent. But the na-
ture of the results would be preserved with less stark assumptions, as
long as the voters are more uncertain about the redistributive policies
of the opponent compared to those of the incumbent.
Given these results, who is better for the voters behind the consti-
tutional veil of ignorance, the bureaucrat or the politician? If voters
are risk neutral, and given that they ignore the redistribution chosen
by the politician, they only care about aggregate performance, y: This
makes the bureaucrat more attractive for the voters for a larger range
of parameter values, compared to the case of simple non-redistributive
tasks in section 2. With risk averse voters, the normative comparison
between bureaucrat and politician also depends on whether the bureau-
crat is "fair" or "unfair". A "fair" bureaucrat is even more attractive
compared to the politician, not only because he is likely to put more
e®ort, but also because he is less risky - the politician exposes the voters
to the risk of being in the minority.28 But the result may be reversed if
the bureaucrat is "unfair" and implements a totally arbitrary redistri-
and Tabellini (2000). But since here voters are forward looking, we rule
out the Bertrand competition among voters that instead features in the
backward looking voting equilibrium of Ferejohn (1986).
27 Indeed, if the voters' reservation utility was W = (￿ + ae)=2 (i.e
if they were certain to be included in the winning coalition by the op-
ponent), then the e®ort of the incumbent would coincide with (7) and
there would be no dilution of e®ort due to redistribution.
28 Maskin and Tirole (2001) also point out the "tyranny of the ma-
jority" or the expropriation of minorities is one reason why politicians
may do worse than non-elected o±cials (unaccountable "judges" in their
context).
28bution. In this case, political redistribution is less risky, since two voters
out of three are always included in the winning majority. The case of
an "unfair" bureaucrat seems more plausible, since in a complex world
it is di±cult to precisely assign redistributive task to a bureaucrat.
We can summarize this discussion in the following:
Proposition 6 The possibility of redistribution reduces the equilibrium
e®ort of the politician, but not that of the bureaucrat. Risk aversion
makes the bureaucrat more or less desirable ex-ante depending on how
easy it is to impose fair treatment of all voters in his task description.
9 Positive analysis
So far weasked what is the optimal task allocation from the voters' point
of view. We now turn to the positive question of how tasks are likely to
be allocated in practice. Bureaucratic institutions, although stable over
time, are not typically spelled out in the constitution. They are chosen
in the course of the regular legislative process by the politicians in o±ce.
Hence, criteria of political expediency dominate this choice. What does
this imply for actual (as opposed to optimal) task allocation? Do elec-
toral considerations push politicians to design e±cient institutions (i.e.
institutions that are optimal for the voters)? And if not, are there sys-
tematic deviations from optimality? A voluminous "positive" andempir-
ical literature in political scienceinvestigates whether or not andwhy the
American Congress delegates; it discusses when delegation is in the elec-
toral interests of politicians, and when it also maximizes social welfare.
The answer generally depends on how the voters evaluate the politician
who has appointed a bureaucrat to perform a certain task. The results
that follow shed light on several of the point discussed informally in this
literature.
In the formal analysis, we let the politicians choose what to delegate
and what not. In reality, bureaucracies themselves "¯ght" for more and
more autonomy, and sometimes are successful even against the will of
politicians. (Carpenter 2001). But the determination of politicians to
retain control varies across tasks. Our results help us understand why
politicians are more willing to ¯ght for some tasks than for others.
9.1 When do politicians delegate?
Westart by asking whatare thegeneral criteria that induce politiciansto
delegate tasks to independent agencies. To preserve comparability with
the previous normative results, we retain the same theoretical frame-
work. Speci¯cally, suppose that there are two tasks, i = 1;2; requiring
29task speci¯c abilities (￿i) and e®orts (ai) :
yi = ￿i + ai
The two task-speci¯c abilities, (￿1;￿2); are independently distributed
according to a normal distribution with mean ¹ ￿ and variance ￿2
￿. The
costs of e®ort are additively separable (C(a1)+ C(a2)) and there are no
spillover e®ects, so that voters' utility is U(y1 + y2): We start with the
simpler case of risk neutral voters: U(y1 + y2) = y1 + y2 - this assump-
tion is relaxed below. Remember that we can interpret the e®ort costs
identically as the utility of rents with a simple rede¯nition of variables.
The timing of events is as usual: ¯rst tasks are allocated at a con-
stitutional stage, then the policymaker in charge chooses e®ort (without
knowing his own abilities), then performance is observed, rewards are
paid and elections take place. The only di®erence is that now, at the
constitutional stage, task allocation is chosen by the politician rather
than by a benevolent planner. The term "constitutional stage" is not
quite appropriate in this case, but we retain it for the sake of a clear
comparison withthe normative analysis. For simplicity, andwithout loss
of generality, we assume that, at the constitutional stage, the politician
faces a binary choice: either he delegates task 2 to an independent bu-
reaucrat, or he keeps it for himself; task 1 is instead restricted to always
remain with the politician.
The voters' behavior is a crucial determinant of the constitutional
choices. This in turn depends on what the voters know. We assume
throughout that voters observe the constitution and fully understand
its implications (alternative assumptions are discussed below). Thus,
constitutional choice is equivalent to a choice amongst equilibria, except
that the perspective is that of the politician rather than the voters.
With rational voters, we also need to spell out whether the consti-
tution is expected to remain in place only in the current period, or also
in the future. In line with the observation that bureaucratic institutions
can be changed through ordinary legislation, we assume no constitu-
tional commitment: the constitution in place today could be changed
after the elections. Thus, an equilibrium constitution is de¯ned as a
task allocation that meets two requirements: ¯rst, it is optimal for the
incumbent politician at the constitutional stage, given the voters' ex-
pectation of the constitution in place after the elections. Second, the
voters' expectations are ful¯lled.
Section 3 of the appendix proves that:
Proposition 7 If voters are risk neutral, then in equilibrium the proba-
bility of reelecting the incumbent politician is always 1/2, irrespective of
30the constitutional choice. Hence, the politician chooses the constitution
that minimizes his equilibrium costs - or more generally, that maximizes
the equilibrium rents from being in o±ce.
Proposition 7 makes clear that electoral concerns donot drive consti-
tutional choice in this framework with risk neutral voters. The reason is
that voters condition re-election on policy performance, but not on con-
stitution design. This in turn follows from the assumption that voters
arerational andunderstandthe implications of alternativeconstitutions,
while they are imperfectly informed about the policymaker's ability in
carrying out his policy tasks. Given this assumption, policy (but not
constitutional choice) reveals the policymaker's ability. Given that the
probability of re-election is always 1/2 irrespective of the constitutional
arrangement, the only criteria governing constitutional choice by the
politician concern the costs of e®ort (or more generally the rents associ-
ated with each task). Speci¯cally, if performing task 2 according to the
voters' expectations is costly, then the politician prefers to delegate it
away. If instead retaining control of task 2 allows the politician to grab
political rents in equilibrium, then he prefers not to delegate it. Note
that equilibrium e®ort by the politician in each task is lower (rents are
higher) if he retains two tasks rather than with a single one. The intu-
itive reasonis that thepolitician is less accountable: withtwotasks there
is a "bundling" problem, and voters cannot punish poor performance in
only one of the two tasks. Since ex-ante the politician is uncertain about
his abilities in both tasks, his incentives to please the voters are weaker
than if he has control of only one task.29
Alternative assumptions would deliver di®erent results relative to
Proposition 7. In particular, if voters were un-informed about task allo-
cation, or if institution design also signalled the politician's ability, then
theresult in Proposition7neednothold. But theassumptionthat voters
only hold politicians responsible for the tasks that they have retained,
and adapt their expectations to what politicians in the opposition would
deliver (i.e. to what is "politically feasible") seems reasonable to us. The
implications of this result are far reaching: if constitutional choice does
not in°uence the election outcome, then voters' welfare is not a relevant
determinant of constitutional choice. Politicians will get rid oftasks that
require attentionand costly e®ort, while they will retain tasks that allow
them to grab political rents. The issue of what is in the voters' interests
simply does not enter the political calculus of costs and bene¯ts.
What does this argument imply about delegation in general? Is there
a political bias towards too much or too little bureaucratic delegation,
29 Proof of this result is available upon request.
31relative to the optimum? The general answer is that politicians will try
to retain ultimate control (so as to appropriate rents), but delegate exe-
cution (so as to get rid of e®ort and costs). In other words, bureaucrats
stay up at night and do the hard work, while politicians grab the rents.
Thus, the model predicts that we should observe extensive delegation to
bureaucrats directly controlled by politicians, but too little delegation
to really independent bureaucrats.
9.2 Redistribution
Many policies have redistributive implications: would politicians dele-
gate those? Suppose that there are only two tasks and the politician is
constrained to keep one task for himself and to delegate the other one to
an independent bureaucrat; but he gets to choose which task to retain
and which one to delegate. Task 1 is a simple task, that gives all voters
the same utility: y1 = ￿1 + a1: Task 2 also gives the policymaker the
ability to choose the allocation of bene¯ts among three groups of voters
indexed by J, as in the cake splitting example of section 8; thus voter
J utility from this task is cJ; and the policymaker is constrained to set P
J cJ = ￿2 + a2:
Our question is which of these two tasks is kept by the politician,
and which one is delegated. As in the previous subsection, we assume
that voters know the constitution and hold the politician accountable
only for the policy task under his control. It is easy show that:
Proposition 8 The politicianalways retains control ofthe redistributive
task
This result is really a direct implication of the analysis carried out
in section 8. As shown in that section, and under the same assumptions
about the political system, the redistributive task allows the politician
to increase the equilibrium probability of re-election above 1/2, while
putting less e®ort to please the voters. Hence it is always preferred com-
pared to a non-redistributive task. The intuitive reason is that redis-
tribution gives the incumbent an advantage, because the redistributive
policies of the opponent are unknown, or less well known than those of
the incumbent. This seems reasonable in practice. An incumbents has
had an opportunity to credibly build coalitions; an opponent can make
promises while out of o±ce, but he does not have the same credibility.
What about tasks that touchthe interests of organized groups? Here
too, the politicianhas apreference toretainthem. As shown in section6,
if the politician is in charge of these tasks, in the equilibria with political
lobbying he receives campaign contributions, which increases his prob-
ability of re-election above 1/2 (see (25)). Hence, the model predicts a
32reluctance of politicians to delegate tasks that a®ect powerful economic
interests, particularly if they are likely to generate campaign contribu-
tions.30 Here there is a stark contrast between what is socially optimal
and what is optimal for an opportunistic politician. If illegal bribes
can be prevented, bureaucratic delegation would be socially optimal,
but would be opposed by politicians interested in extracting campaign
contributions from lobbies.
9.3 Risk averse voters
Proposition 8 above was derived under the assumption that voters are
risk neutral. We now consider risk averse voters, and ask what this
implies for the politician's incentives to delegate to an independent bu-
reaucrat. In particular, we ask whether the politician is more keen to
delegate risky or safe tasks (a risky task is one in which performance is
also determined by nature, and not just by the policymaker's e®ort and
ability).
There are two tasks and the politician has to choose which one to
delegate to an independent bureaucrat (i.e., for simplicity we restrict his
choices so that he cannot retain control of both tasks). Task 1 is "safe"
and gives voters utility y1 = ￿+a: Task 2 is "risky", in that performance
(and voters' utility) also depends on a random exogenous component:
y2 = ￿ + a + "; as in the case of imperfect monitoring of section 3,
voters only observe y1 and y2; but do not observe ": For simplicity, the
required ability, ￿; is the same in the two tasks. We only consider the
case in which voters expect that, after the elections, the constitution
will give the safe task to the politician. The opposite case (of a future
constitution that gives the politician control over the risky task) yields
the same conclusions.
Suppose that, at the constitutional stage, the politician retains the
safe task and delegates the risky one. His ability ￿ is then fully revealed
30 In theequilibriuminwhichthe politicianreceives bribes (rather than
campaign contributions), he is strictly indi®erent between delegating to
a bureaucrat or not (since the optimal bribe by the lobby would leave
him indi®erent). But withmore than one organizedgroup, the politician
can extract rents from the lobbies, and he would strictly prefer to retain
control rather than delegate.
33to the voters when they observe y1: At the election, the voters thus
anticipate that re-electing the incumbent gives them utility U(￿ + ae):
Voting for the unknown opponent, instead, gives the voters an expected
utility of EU(￿+ae); where theexpectations operator is over the random
variable ￿: The equilibrium probability of re-appointment is thus:
Pr[U(￿ +a
e) ¸ EU(￿ +a
e)] (36)
where now the probability refers to the random variable ￿ (since the
incumbent still ignores his own ability when setting policy and when
choosing the constitution). If U(:) is strictly concave, the probability in
(36) is clearly above 1/2, the more so the greater is the uncertainty over
￿ and the more concave is the utility function.31 In other words, when
voters are risk averse, the incumbent enjoys an electoral advantage. The
reason is that the voters know more about the incumbent than about
the opponent, and this makes them more reluctant to switch. But the
size of the incumbency advantage depends on which tasks are retained
by the politician.
Speci¯cally, suppose that, at the constitutional stage, the politi-
cian delegates the safe task and retains the risky one. Now, the vot-
ers can no longer infer the incumbent ability from their observation of
y2: Reappointing the incumbent thus gives the voters an expected util-
ity of E(U(￿ + ae) j ￿ + "); where the expectations operator refers to
the expectation over ￿; conditional upon observing ￿ + ": The expected
utility of voting for the opponent, instead, is unchanged (by the assump-
tion that there is no constitutional commitment and after the election
the politician retains the safe task for himself). Hence, the equilibrium
probability of reappointment is:
Pr[E(U(￿ + ae) j ￿ + ") ¸ EU(￿ +ae)] (37)
where now the probability refers to the random variable ￿ +": By strict
concavityofU(:); andsincetheunconditional meanof "is0, wehave that
U(￿+ae) > E(U(￿+ae) j ￿+") for all values of￿: Thus, theprobability in
(37) is strictly smaller than that in (36) - i.e. the incumbency advantage
is smaller if the politician retains the risky task rather than the safe one.
We cannot conclude from this comparison that the politician prefers
to retain the safe task for himself, however. The reason is that equilib-
rium e®ort is generally higher under the safe task: since the politician
31 This can be seen by noting that Pr
£
U(￿ +ae) ¸ U(¹ ￿ + ae)
¤
= 1=2;
and that EU(￿ + ae) < U(¹ ￿ + ae) by strict concavity of U(:):
34faces less uncertainty, he ¯nds it optimal to put more e®ort into the safe
task than in the risky one. This can be seen by adapting the analysis of
section 3 to the case of risk averse voters.
We summarize the foregoing discussion in the following:
Proposition 9 The constitutional choice between the safe and the risky
task entails a trade-o® between votes and rents (or e®ort). By keep-
ing the safe task and delegating the risky one, the politician increases
his incumbency advantage but reduces equilibrium rents (equivalently, he
increases equilibrium e®ort).
Thus, when voters are risk averse, electoral concerns do in°uence
constitutional choice, contrary to the case of risk neutral voters. But
this does not push the constitution towards greater e±ciency for the
voters. It simply makes the politician more willing to delegate risky
tasks. Intuitively, the politician is aware that risk averse voters punish
bad luck more harshly than they reward good luck. He thus prefers
to leave this risk to the bureaucrat. In a sense, the bureaucrat acts as
a "scapegoat" for the politician, as suggested by Fiorina (1977). This
incentive is tempered by the opposite considerations concerning rents (or
e®ort), however, since more risky tasks are also associated with greater
rents.
Sometimes scapegoats for politicians can be welfare improving, since
they take the blame for "unpopular" but needed policies. In Europe,
national politicians often publicly blame bureaucrats in the European
Commission that tie their hands, but in private they sometimes wel-
come these constraints and may even suggest to the Commission how
to formulate its recommendations. A similar role may be served by
other international bureaucracies, such as the IMF, when it prescribes
"unpopular" policies to macroeconomically unstable countries (Vreeland
2003).
Proposition 9 is also relevant for other institutional choices besides
delegation, and in particular for the design of more or less transparent
procedures for policy formation. Transparency of public policy is an
important dimension of institutions and it a choice variable. Politicians
can make a policy process more or less transparent. In this choice, they
are likely to face a trade-o® similar to that summarized in Proposition
9. More transparency has the bene¯t of increasing the incumbency ad-
vantage, because the voters are better able to assess the qualities of
the incumbent, while they know less about the opponent. But more
transparency is also likely to reduce equilibrium rents, because the pun-
ishment for rent extraction is more severe. Depending on which incen-
tives are likely to prevail, politicians will choose more or less transparent
35procedures. An interesting application of this idea is to the budget pro-
cess. In many countries the government budget is very non transparent
and this is considered a "problem" from the point of view of optimal-
ity of institutions. But the degree of budget trasnparency. is entirely
endogenous and it is the result of politicians' strategic choices. In fact
the government budget is the primary source of rents broadly de¯ned
for politicians. Otherwise there would be no reason not to simplify the
budget documents and the budget process.32
10 Conclusions
Our analysis rests on two fundamental assumptions. The ¯rst one con-
cerns the motivation of di®erent types of policymakers. Bureaucrats
want to signal their competence for career concerns, politicians for re-
election purposes. The second assumption is that the tasks for bureau-
cratic agencies have to be speci¯ed ex ante and cannot be contingent
on the realization of too many shocks on the environment and/or on
the public's preferences. If one accepts these two hypotheses, the na-
ture of our results is quite robust to variations on other less important
assumptions.
From a normative perspective, these di®erences between bureaucrats
and politicians imply that some policy tasks, but not others, ought to be
delegated to independent agencies. Consider ¯rst policies with few re-
distributive implications, such as monetary policy or foreign policy. Bu-
reaucrats are likely to be better than politicians if the criteria for good
performance can be easily described ex-ante and are stable over time; if
good performance requires special abilities and performance evaluation
presupposes some technical expertise; if political incentives are distorted
by time inconsistency or short-termism. Monetary policy indeed ful¯lls
many of these conditions, and the practice of delegating it to an inde-
pendent agency accords with some of these normative results. Foreign
policy does not, because the criteria for good performance are unstable
and more vague, and the bene¯t of insulating policy from the political
32 See Alesina and Perotti (1999) for a survey of the literature on
budget institution and of transparency. Alesina and Cukierman (1991)
discuss a di®erent model in which also the degree of transparency can
be chosen endogenously by politicians who would not always choose the
maximum level of this variable.
36process are smaller.
Next, consider policies that have redistributive implications, such as
trade policy, regulation, or ¯scal policy. Here, bureaucrats perform well
if the policy consequences touch narrowly de¯ned interest groups, if cri-
teria of good performance canbe easily formulated and assessed in terms
ofe±ciency, and if the legal system is strong. Politicians insteadare bet-
ter if the policy has far reaching redistributive implications, if criteria
of aggregate e±ciency do not easily pin down the optimal policy, and if
there are interactions across di®erent policy domains (so that a single
measure ofperformanceisa®ected by several policy instruments andpol-
icy packaging is important). Regulation of public utilities or of speci¯c
industries are examples of policies that lend themsleves to bureaucratic
delegation, since they pit special interests against those of consumers
as a whole, do not have large spillover e®ects, and policy performance
can be evaluated on the basis of e±ciency or other semi-technical cri-
teria. Trade policy might fall in this cathegory too, although here the
redistributive implications are more pronounced. Welfare state policies,
instead, have such broad redistributive implications that it seems risky
to subtract them from the political process, as suggested by our exam-
ple on cake splitting. But there are speci¯c aspects of ¯scal policy that
would certainly meet our normative criteria for bureaucratic delegation:
for instance, detailed tax policy provisions, or intertemporal ¯scal policy
choices where time inconsistency or political myopia is an obvious issue,
as suggested by Blinder (1997).
Overall, the normative analysis suggests that there is ample scope for
bureaucratic delegationto improve over political delegation, particularly
if politicians remain in charge of de¯ning and correcting the general mis-
sion of independent agencies. But these normative conclusions are not
likely to be re°ected in observed institutional arrangements. There is no
reason why opportunistic politicians should internalize these normative
criteria. Actual institutions are more likely to be designed so as to de-
liver maximal rents at the lowest risk for the incumbent politician. This
argues for retaining under political control policy tools that are useful
to build winning coalitions or to generate campaign contributions, such
as trade policy or much of ¯scal policy. It also means that politicians
might want to get rid of tasks that expose them to risk, such as mon-
etary policy. But this "risk shielding" is possible only if bureaucratic
delegation is complete, so that the blame for policy failure lies with the
independent agency and not the politician. This might explain why it
is politically so di±cult to exploit delegation to independent agencies in
¯scal policy. Full bureaucratic delegationof ¯scal policy is inconceivable,
for normative and positive reasons. But partial delegation of narrowly
37de¯ned technical tasks in ¯scal policy is politically unfeasible, no matter
how desirable. The reason is that voters would still hold the politician
accountable, as long as he retains some control (i.e. unless the delega-
tion is complete). And if he is held responsible, then the politician loses
any incentive to delegate control.
Appendix
1. Optimal contracts with bureaucrats
Consider the model ofsection2. It is easy to show that the ¯rst order
condition (4) also implicitly de¯nes the ¯rst best level of e®ort in a con-
tract between voters (the principals) and the bureaucrat (the agent) in
which e®ort is observable and contractible. Since voters and bureaucrat
are risk neutral, this ¯rst best can be achieved with an optimal contract
even if e®ort and ability are not separately observable. Such optimal
contract would reward the bureaucrat with a simple linear payo®:
R(y) = y ¡ b
where the constant b is de¯ned by the agent's (ex-ante) participation
constraint, namely by the condition that
E(R(y))¡ C(a) ¸ 0 (38)
Under the optimal contract, the participation constraint must bind, and
given (1) and (38), this implies: b = ¹ ￿ + a¤ ¡ C(a¤) where a¤ denotes
¯rst best e®ort as de¯ned in (4).
Thus, in this simple model of section 2, the implicit rewardo®ered by
career concerns induces the same level of e®ort as the optimal contract,
but there is no guarantee that the participation constraint on the agent
binds or is evensatis¯ed. Throughout, we assume that ¹ ￿ ¸ C(a¤). Given
the reward function in (3), this insures that the participation constraint
for the bureaucrat is satis¯ed. Of course, if the above inequality is strict,
then the bureaucrat enjoys some positive rents under the career concerns
contract, that he would not enjoy under the optimal contract (i.e. the
voters ought to tax the bureaucrat when he is appointed).
2. Time inconsistency
There are two tasks, i = 1;2; and:
U(y1;y2) = y1 +y2 (39)
For task two y2 = ￿ +a2: But y1 depends also on private sector expec-
tations, ae
2.
y1 = ￿ +a1 ¡ (a2 ¡ ae
2) (40)
38Suppose throughout that policy commitments are unavailable, mean-
ing that ¯rst private expectations are formed, and then e®ort in both
tasks, a1 and a2; are chosen. In order to stress the di®erence between
the bureaucrat and the politician, suppose now that costs are additive:
c = C(a1) + C(a2): The politician allocates e®ort so as to maximize:
Pr(y1 + y2 ¸ W) ¡ C(a1)¡ C(a2) (41)
taking the voters' reservation utility;W; and the private sector expec-
tations, ae
2; as given. In equilibrium, W = 2¹ ￿ + ae
1 + ae
2 . Taking the
¯rst order optimality conditions for the politician and imposing rational









Equilibrium e®ort on task 1 is determined by the same condition as in
section 3, except that the left hand side is divided by 2 because now
task 1 only contributes 50% to improve the politician's chances for re-
election. But the politician exerts no e®ort at all on task 2 because
ex-post the bene¯t for the voters from this policy outcome are exactly
o®set by the negative e®ect on the performance of task 1. Since voters
assign equal weights to both tasks, and e®ort is costly, the politician
ex-post prefers to do nothing. Of course, this is suboptimal from an
ex-ante perspective: only unexpectedly high a2 hurts the performance of
task 1, and under rational expectations the voters would be better o®
if the politician could commit to exert high e®ort also in task 2, and
expectations were formed accordingly. Overall voters' utility under the
politician is thus:
UP = 2¹ ￿ +aP
1 (43)
Next, consider the bureaucrat, and suppose that his ability is evalu-
ated according to a composite measure of performance, y = –y1 + (1 ¡
–)y2, as in (12) above. Repeating the same steps, and still taking expec-





Like the politician, and for the same reasons, the bureaucrat too exerts
less e®ort in task 2 than in task 1, because under discretion he perceives
a cost from unexpectedly high e®ort. In fact, for – ¸ 1=2, (45) implies
39aB
2 = 0: But now, the constitution gives a tool to overcome this incentive
problem: tilting the bureaucratic mission towards task 2, with – < 1=2;
induces the bureaucrat to reduce aB
1 and increase aB
2 : Since costs are
convex, at least oversome range aB
2 increases by more thanaB
1 is reduced.
Moreover, ifexpectationsare formed after the constitutional stage, this is
re°ected into expectations, and aB
2 = ae
2; so that the loss in performance
in task 1 is more than o®set by the improved performance in task 2.
Hence, the voters' expected utility is:
U





Unless e®ort by the politician in task 1 is very high, the voters are likely
to be better o® under the bureaucrat.
In fact, voters would be even better o® if tasks 1 and 2 could be split
between two distinct bureaucrats (or between a politician in charge of
task 1 and a bureaucrat in charge of task 2). The bureaucrat in charge
of task 2 could be given a mission de¯ned only on y2 as a basis of perfor-
mance, and someone else couldbe in charge of task 1. This wouldget rid
entirely of the time inconsistency, since the bureaucrat in charge of task
2 would now disregard completely the negative impact of unexpectedly
high a2 in the performance of the other task. The proposition in the
text follows.
3. Lobbying
As stated in the text, the equilibrium with lobbying must solve the
following optimization problem by choice of a1;a2 and f; subject to non-
negativity constraints on the three choice variables, and taking voters'
expectations ae
1 as given, as before.
Max
©
Pr(￿ ¸ ¹ ￿ +a
e
1¡ a1¡ H(f)) +(1 +￿)a2 ¡ C(a1 + a2) ¡ f
ª
(47)
The ¯rst order conditions for a1; a2 and f evaluated at the point
ae
1 = a1 imply respectively:
n(¹ ￿ ¡ H(f))¡ Ca(a1 + a2) + „1=0 (48)
1+ ￿ ¡ Ca(a1 + a2) + „2=0 (49)
n(¹ ￿ ¡ H(f))Hf(f) ¡ 1+ „3=0 (50)
where „i; i = 1;2 are the lagrange multipliers on the non-negativity con-
straints for ai; while „3 is the lagrange multiplier on the non-negativity
constraint for f:
Consider ¯rst the case Hf(0) < 1=(1 + ￿): Since Hff < 0; here
lobbying is ine±cient, and the ¯rst order conditions can only be satis¯ed
40iff = a2 = 0 anda1 isat an interior optimum de¯nedby (48) with„1 = 0
in it.
Next, consider the case Hf(f¤) > 1=(1 + ￿): This is the opposite
extreme, in which lobbying is very e®ective. In this case a1 = 0 and
a2 and f¤ are at an interior optimum de¯ned by (49) and (50) with
„2 = „3 = 0 in them.
In the intermediate case, in which Hf(0) > 1=(1+￿) but the returns
tocampaigncontributions fall rapidly, anequilibriumwith lobbyingdoes
not always exist. A special knife edge case is given by the case in which
Hf(0) > 1=(1 + ￿) and Hf(f¤) = 1=(1 + ￿) = n(¹ ￿ ¡ Hf(f¤)). Here a1
and a2 can both be positive, and are de¯ned by
1+ ￿ = Ca(a1 + a2)
and by the condition that the politician is indi®erent between this equi-
librium and the one with no lobbying.
4. Equilibrium constitutions
Proof of Proposition 8
Consider four cases: delegation vs no-delegation today, given that
the voters expect no-delegation after the elections; and delegation vs no-
delegation today, given that voters expect delegation after the elections.
Suppose that the voters expect that, after the election, the politician
will retain both tasks. Consider each of the two possible constitutional
arrangements for the current period. Under bureaucratic delegation
(i.e.. the politician is in charge of task 1 while the bureaucrat is in
chargeof task 2), the probability of reappointment is: Pr(y1 ¸ W) (since
the ability of the incumbent politician in the second task is unknown,
it cannot in°uence the election outcome). If voters are rational and
fully understand the institutions in place, then their reservation utility
is: W = ¹ ￿ + ae. The equilibrium is then exactly as in section 2 above.
In particular, the probability of reappointment is: Pr(￿ + aP
1 ¸ ¹ ￿ +
ae
1) = 1=2: If instead the politician keeps the second task for himself, and
given that the voters understand it, the probability of reappointment is:
Pr(y1 + y2 ¸ W) = Pr(￿1 + ￿2 ¸ W ¡ a1 ¡ a2); where the reservation
utility is now given by: W = 2¹ ￿ + ae
1 + ae
2: In equilibrium (i.e., with
aP
i = ae
i; i = 1;2), the probability of reappointment is thus: Pr(￿1+￿2 ¸
2¹ ￿) = 1=2:
Now suppose that the voters expect that, after the election, the
politician will delegate task 2 and only retain task 1. Here, the rele-
vant reservation threshold imposed by rational voters is: W = ¹ ￿ + ae
1;
since voters know that task 2 will not be controlled by the politician af-
ter the elections. Hence, the equilibrium probability of reappointment is
41Pr(y1 ¸ W) = Pr(￿1 ¸ ¹ ￿) = 1=2; irrespective of whether the politician
delegates or not before the elections.33
33 Note that we have implicitly assumed that voters separately observe
y1 and y2; but this does not matter. If this was not the case, and in the
case of no-delegation voters only observed y1+ y2; then the equilibrium
probability of reappointment under no-delegation would be Pr(￿1+￿2
2 ¸
¹ ￿); which is still equal to 1/2.
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